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# STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE



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*A coaching by the voice of experience against a common operational emergency.*

## YOU AND YOUR WALK-IN

F. M. Begoum

No pattern of approach has been established by walk-ins. They have come into our diplomatic missions, military installations, other official establishments; they have come to non-official concerns, to private citizens; they have come to the local services and been turned over to us; they have walked in directly to our intelligence field stations or to our intelligence officers under deep cover; they have walked in everywhere. When they appear behind the iron curtain, or more broadly speaking in hostile areas, the problems they pose may be exceedingly difficult to manage.

Our handling of walk-ins over the years has ranged from very good to abominable. Out of this experience some aspects of a walk-in case that are particularly sensitive to good or bad handling can be distinguished. They fall mainly into the categories of advance preparation, first contacts, and early planning for exploitation.

### *Advance Preparation*

There is a certain amount of preparation that can be done. Beyond that, success depends on officer competence, usually acquired by experience. What characteristics does the school of human experience grind out? Herodotus said of Themistocles that he surpassed all others in the faculty of intuitively meeting an emergency. This is the characteristic we are looking for when it comes to handling walk-ins. Given officers with the necessary personal qualities, a proper reception of the walk-in still requires preparatory steps within the field station, with other U.S. agencies, and with respect to foreign liaison.

*Be ready for the unexpected.* Within the station, there should be a psychological preparedness for walk-ins. Keep tuned to the possibility that a walk-in may happen in your area at any moment. Latin America these days may be rela-

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tively calm as far as Soviets are concerned, but numbers of Castro's disaffected friends will be knocking at many different doors for some time to come. Times change in this respect. We go through Soviet periods, Hungarian periods, Czech periods, Iraqi periods, Cuban periods.<sup>1</sup>

*Know the ground rules.* After attitude come the ground rules. Know the various prescribed operating procedures. An especially important one regarding walk-ins is IDCOP 58/1 dated 6 May 1960. The complications within our intelligence community these days are considerable; unless you are aware of the rules, the case can be hurt from the beginning. The CIA station chief, who, when an enemy intelligence officer presents himself, decides to leave the walk-in waiting while he calls a meeting of the defector committee is needlessly complicating his task. Time enough to call a meeting later; the espionage and counterespionage business is a CIA responsibility. This does not mean that the legitimate interest of other agencies in the matter should be slighted, but the CIA officer must exercise initiative and leadership.

*Think in political terms.* The newspaper headlines change from day to day. Mr. Khrushchev smiles or he scowls, he jeers or he jokes; the Iraqi and Cuban regimes fall or stand—such things form the political crux which in many instances has prompted the walk-in. Are we in a time of tension, with Khrushchev agitating about Berlin, or Mao threatening the Taiwan Straits? This makes a difference when a man comes in and says he is a Soviet intelligence agent or working for the Chinese Communists. He is played against this background. We also have a new dimension in certain areas because of United Nations interests. The political factor is an important one to keep in mind.

*Know the liaison equities.* Know the do's and don't's with respect to the local foreign service. How far can you go unilaterally, considering the liaison relationship? In what instances do we feel that we must tell them, and when would holding out fall within acceptable risk? This applies particu-

<sup>1</sup> And the Berlin wall can be expected to cause many defectors who otherwise would have escaped in Germany to show up in diverse odd places around the world.

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larly in our larger stations that tend to be sectionalized: they may have an external liaison unit that deals with the local services and an internal unit working on other activities. The walk-in may come to this latter, not the one dealing with liaison. Does it know what the real equities are? Its initial handling may prejudice the liaison relationship and may hamper efficient subsequent handling of the walk-in.

*Prepare handling facilities in advance.* There is nothing more disheartening than an *ad hoc* performance like the following. The telephone rings:

"We've got one! What about the house?"

"No, we can't use that house."

"Is there anyone who speaks Arabic?"

"No; I think Joe speaks a few words of Albanian. Will that do?"

"No, no! This guy only speaks Arabic."

You can't plan for everything, but you can plan for a certain number of things. This may mean taking a quiet inventory of other U.S. organizations in the area. Is there a person in another installation who speaks a likely language? Maybe you have his name recorded and have done a bit of checking to avoid the ludicrous situation of having someone walk in whom nobody can understand or question. Do a linguistic inventory in advance.

Think a bit about how we transport people, how we guard them. Get the simple technical equipment ready, so that you can pick it up and go. Try to have a secure room set up, already bugged. Have a standard operating procedure—not a dusty bureaucratic one, but one that has been given a few dry runs. In a station of any size you may have certain officers that work together best. Earmark those officers for handling particular cases. These are the things that count in making the most of opportunities. Think about a unilateral handling and about a liaison-type handling. You may have to use different officers, you may have to use different facilities; but prepare for it in advance. Don't get Joe and Charlie and Pete half way downtown in a car and then suddenly remember: "Oh my gosh, Charlie's never been exposed to the local service. Eddie, you go see if you can catch him before they get

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down there, because I don't want him blown." Or Charlie has already arrived, and you ask yourself how to explain this one.

Work out walk-in procedures with our diplomatic representations, military installations, and other offices. It is tragic to have a good walk-in or defector turned away by some unwitting clerk when he tries to make contact with us.

See that reception procedures are made known to our contacts in the host liaison services. At a minimum, hopefully, they will consult us if they get a walk-in they can't handle. If possible, we want to work up from this minimum, when we get early access, to the point of guiding the liaison service and in effect directing the case. The custody problem is always a tough one because we have no legal status. We can get into very sticky situations if we are brash—"That's all right, throw him into the cellar and we'll work him over for a couple of days"—about it. In some areas you may induce cooperation from a liaison service by feeding it information derived from walk-ins in other areas. It may stop to reflect, "There's more to handling these walk-ins than just throwing them in jail," and it may draw the correct conclusion that it should check with us the next time it has one.

#### *First Contact*

Many walk-in cases become successes or failures literally within the first five minutes. The initial moment of contact is a most critical time, and this is where the intuitive reaction to emergencies is important. The case officer whose instinct is to go scuttling behind his cover for fear of being "provoked" is not likely to handle a walk-in very well. It is a question of striking a balance between preservation of some security and possible operational gain. The right balance varies; behind the curtain, obviously, no matter how important the operational gain, security is paramount. In certain areas security is much less a factor. But inevitably all first contacts involve this search for balance.

Think in advance how you would operate within the framework of your cover, official or non-official, if a walk-in should appear. How much leeway do you have within that cover to do the things discussed below? Next, and the decision can only be taken on the spot, consider where you may be able

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to give or bend a little farther. Meeting the man outside in your car may be a personal indiscretion; talking with him inside an official installation may lead to considerable difficulty with respect to your cover agency. Most agencies dislike to have spy business done on the premises, but there are times when it has been done and has been well worth while.

What do you ask him? First, *who is he?* It is surprising how many times this obvious requirement is honored in the breach. Headquarters once received a long cable giving a full physical description but no name at all. In another the walk-in was reported to have given a name but to have said immediately that it was not his real name. Was any probing made for it? Any attempt to elicit it? Any attempt to get documents? Practice a little tradecraft. If he says, "No, I won't give you my name," ask, "Well sir, do you have any means of identification?" Maybe he says, "Yes, I have my passport, but I'm not going to show you the name." He shows you the passport, and maybe you see the number. Or later in the conversation, he makes reference to "these papers I have," or claims, "My report on this I have right here." *Could I see that?*

We are looking for information that we can check. That is why we want the man's name—patronymic and all the rest—and that is why we want him to write it out in his native script. The man has presented himself in Paris and his name is Kim and he claims to be a Korean: how helpful in this in terms of tracing? Full names are particularly important for Russians, Chinese Communists, and Satellite nationals. Headquarters' files are improving every day, and communications are fast. We have been in the business for quite a number of years; we have run a lot of cases. The Soviet service and the Chinese service may be ubiquitous, but so are we. Sometimes, through speedy cable communications, you can literally break the case while you are talking to the walk-in. In one instance the data obtained from the walk-in was taken out of the meeting, slammed on the wire, checked, and returned within four hours; and the next interrogator broke the man with the information. We do have the facilities, but something has to be put into the machine before you can get something back.

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Another point on checkable information: attempt within the station to identify sources or check records that may throw immediate light on the man who has walked in. For instance, if he says, "I'm an importer of Chinese art objects here in Santiago," is there a directory of the Santiago Chamber of Commerce? Sometimes a look at the local phone book enables you to check some of the information quickly. Be precise in obtaining and recording data. Don't be afraid to take notes. If he objects, you have at worst to stop and start memorizing.

*What is he?* What does he profess to be, and what do you think he is? What position, what rank, what functions; what nationality? Surprisingly enough, headquarters gets some cables which omit any reference to nationality.

*What does he want?* Sometimes you have to ask him. Some of our people tend to lurk behind their cover, talking busily but never quite getting to the point. *Why does he want this?* What is his claim in this respect and what do you think the real story is? Once more, are there any documents; is there any other evidence pointing to the real reason as against the professed reason?

*Has he brought anything along?* It is sometimes forgotten to ask, "Now you say you're here for this. Do you have anything with you that would help?" Another aspect is to check whether he is armed. Once a Soviet soldier came in buttoned up in a greatcoat. After an hour or so, he opened it because the room was getting warm, and you could see a pistol in each pocket. He was finally convinced that he was in good hands and could safely relinquish his weapons.

Don't be afraid of alienating the walk-in by asking logical questions. He has come in with something in mind. A sympathetic, calm attitude can get a lot out of him. If you are dashing around the room barking orders and telephoning, the man who was not panicked when he came in will be after you have worked with him ten or fifteen minutes. Any walk-in is under a terrific mental strain; this has been true in all cases we have had. One of your initial aims, then, is somehow to calm him down a bit.

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Some case officers are put off by people who are dirty, who behave in an erratic manner, who reek of garlic, who seem offensive or disreputable. Our personal prejudices should not be allowed to get in the way. The espionage business is one of tension. The cork may blow any time, and a walk-in is a person who in a sense has blown his top. There have been a number of defectors, particularly intelligence officers on the other side, who later did wind up in a sanitarium. Regardless of any humane aspects, our business with walk-ins is to achieve certain intelligence objectives. To do this, we have to deal with a very wide range of people, many of whom do not fit into normal patterns.

First, try to get a secure and quiet spot where you can talk. The embassy corridor is not the place to discuss business; get him off to one side. This is an essential part of preserving the security of a possible operation. Walk-ins are very strange: the man who says that under no circumstances will he go back may in two hours, after you have worked on him, agree to return and stay in place. If only during that first ten minutes you had not kept talking to him in the corridor, and the official from Section 3 of the Ministry of the Interior who knows you had not come in and seen you there! Thinking about the security of the operation, you come again to the risk point. Is there any risk involved when you tell him to come on into this particular office? Perhaps; but great undertakings do not succeed unless some risk is taken. The business of espionage and counterespionage involves taking some chances about certain things, including one's personal cover. Though cowboyism is not in order, reasonable chances can be taken.

A word about provocation. A provocation is in essence an inducement to act to your own disadvantage; but the term has taken on distorted meanings. Officers say "I didn't dare because I was afraid of being provoked." Don't let this bugaboo scare you so much that you can't operate within your cover. If the object of the provocation is to see whether anyone in the cover installation will talk to a man who comes in and says, "I'm from Z-2 of the Polish service," then the moment you shake his hand or say hello you've been provoked. An analysis of the possibility that this walk-in is a provocation attempt should be made as soon as time permits, but

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not at the expense of initial development of the walk-in on the evidence at hand. Just keep in mind that provocation pays off for the opposition only when it is able to exploit a reaction on your part. Without a revealing reaction, there can be no provocation.

The atmosphere of the initial conversation should be friendly, businesslike, sympathetic, person-to-person. Limit the number of people in contact with the walk-in to those who fit into a definite scheme. He should have, if possible, one point of focus. At the beginning, if the man has been torn or blasted from his roots in whatever organization or culture he comes from, we want to give him a point upon which he can reassemble himself psychologically. It is much better, in general, not to have a host of interpreters, or bosses, or clerks, dashing in and out. This distracts him.

Try to get along without an interpreter, especially from outside the station. Many walk-ins are antagonized by being outnumbered by "foreigners." If neither of you speaks the other's language but you both speak French poorly, it will be difficult, but probably not impossible, to handle the case without outside help. Try to do it even at the risk of taking a bit longer and at the risk of some misunderstanding unless you have your own linguist. You may want to act as a caretaker handler, handling the case until the fluent Polish speaker arrives and takes over.

Try to establish some basis of rapport; we sometimes become a bit too formal. The rapport may be a professional one: the man may be an intelligence officer and intelligence operations the thing he wants to talk about. If this is the topic of your initial conversation, your attitude varies according to your cover. On the other hand, he may say, "That's a beautiful stamp book you have on your desk. I'm a stamp collector myself." Maybe this is the time to take the heat off, answering, "Yes, I just got some new issues from Guinea; do you have these?" Give him some tie to which to cling. Establish some basis of rapport even if it has to be a bit contrived. Use your tradecraft and elicit things rather than beat them out of him.

Don't be too impatient. The thing may be important, time may be of the essence, but don't let it show. Balance the needs of the handling problem against the urgency of the information. Almost without exception, the thing to do is to

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calm him down; you will find that what he says in a highly emotional state contains many errors. Sometimes the balancing becomes very tight. For instance, the man comes in and identifies himself as a KGB officer. He has been working on a certain operation which you immediately recognize as a case of your own. You're meeting the agent in an hour, and you're meeting him in a safehouse. This is one of the situations that separate the men from the boys in the matter of getting first things done first.

The question of asylum often comes up very early. It is always a tricky one, but sometimes needless difficulties are created. You don't have to be able to say on the spot, "Yes, we are going to give you a job and a passport." The walk-in is pushing for it, always, and may say, as some hardnoses have, "Money, transportation, citizenship, or I don't talk. I'm not going to tell you anything unless you assure me that this is it. . . . Well, I will tell you that I'm an intelligence officer. . . . I'm the residentura deputy. . . . Now you know who I am. How about the passport?" Don't be thrown off guard first thing by this; recognize that he is plugging for all he can get. Remember that you have some maneuverability. We should not make commitments on which we will back down later. This is true not only for moral reasons, but for highly practical ones—word gets around.

So you walk the tightrope with respect to commitment on asylum. The basic policy is to grant political asylum to any genuine defector from the Sino-Soviet bloc. The key point is that this does not necessarily mean asylum in our country. And the emphasis is on any *genuine* defector: "Yes, you will be granted political asylum if you are what you claim to be, if you are not working for the other side," etc., etc. You have to do a lot of hedging. It is a very poor tactic to say, "We'll take you to our country if you're valuable enough." But it is extremely difficult to set a tactic that works with everyone. Know the basic policy, and be prepared for a certain amount of maneuvering and bargaining, sometimes rather bizarre. It is surprising how quickly the man comes down in his demands in order to get what he essentially requires—protection from his former colleagues or masters.

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### *Operational Planning*

While talking to the man, start making plans. Try to begin the operational planning, even though you may not be the officer who will ultimately be responsible for it. Don't try to plan all the way through to the top echelon, but plan for the immediate future. Think about your own cover and security and how long you are going to maintain your initial attitude. Think about the political aspects. Think about the local liaison aspects. Start ticking off to one side items which have possible significance with respect to the walk-in's bonafides. Consider the provocation aspect. Look for indications that he is a fabricator. Start an assessment of his value. And, most significantly of all, think about those aspects which have an essentially perishable nature.

Do any operational exploitation possibilities which he has directly indicated or implied appear to be perishable? For instance, suppose he had just been to a big farewell party for his brother case officer, who is being transferred back to Russia, and this was what threw him over the brink—that the other chap, who also hates the regime, is leaving in an hour and a half and he'd be all alone. This is the time you might want to ask. "Now how about it, would he like to come over too?" Maybe you'd get a yes answer. It would be a shame to let this wait three hours while you sit in the safehouse, and then have *him* say, "I wish I'd called up my old friend Boris before he left the train," and you, caught short, "You mean he'd have come over too?"—"Probably; he was very upset."

*Will he return to his installation to obtain documents or materials?* The key items are cryptological materials. If a man comes in and says, "I'm the code clerk" or "I run the machines in that room up there," don't say, "Very interesting. We'll get to that later. First tell me . . ." A cable was once sent to headquarters saying that a case appeared to have excellent psywar possibilities for exploitation against a certain hostile nation and the walk-in's position in the embassy was that of code clerk—a real aberration in operational assessment! First things first, and we are still hopefully going for the operational jugular, which is commo, commo-crypto.

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Obviously, what we'd most like is an in-place source. If he will not stay in place, however, perhaps we happen to be in a position to do a decent stitch job on the pads. We just might want him to go in and get them, bring them out for an hour, two hours, three hours, and then take them back and leave.

All intelligence agencies are at fault in that everyone knows a little bit about something that by all the rules of the game he should not know about. This can apply also in the sensitive field of commo-crypto. The walk-in even from outside the commo field might be able to supply the precise bit of information that would break the code. You can get quick answers from headquarters on the business of important documents or materials, cryptological materials especially.

One caution: don't use this as a way of having him prove his bona fides. It doesn't prove his bona fides necessarily and it may just boot the whole case out the window.

*Will he return to his installation as an agent?* We are far more interested in in-place agents than we are in defectors. If not a flat 100-percent rule, this is about 90 percent true these days. A man has to be at quite a high level before we really want him as a defector rather than in place. The penetration is the guts of the business as far as we are concerned. The defector is valuable, but his knowledgeability with respect to current information is obviously dead the moment he leaves his installation. The in-place source is the one that truly puts us in business.

*Will he undertake an operational mission?* The mission might be to contact someone else, or to trap or entice someone else from the installation. It might be to induce someone to move to the point where we could trap him or make a run at him. Occasionally the walk-in can serve as the catalyst for putting to operational use material that has been months in the collecting. We have had our target selected, have gathered quantities of data, but have never been able to get an approach to him. Suddenly a walk-in appears who can provide this missing link.

*Will he write or telephone a friend?* There are always new twists to the well-worn letter and telephone techniques. Occasionally you can put the recipient on the spot, especially if you have compromising information. Does he report the

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letter in which you make reference to certain things he would not want his superior to know about? You would have told him, in essence, "if you don't bring this to the attention of your chiefs, we will. We'll send a copy to the home office." Sometimes he'll come over, sometimes not. In any case you have made him extremely uncomfortable.

*What does this do to other operations?* An aspect of walk-in defection that should be considered early is the immediate effect on our own cases when the hostile service becomes aware of the defection. Can it affect our double agents or penetrations of this service or of other targets? Does it influence the conduct of our staff officers or contract agents? Once an important Soviet defection culminating quite a series seemed to raise the temperature so high that we reluctantly put armed guards at all meetings with penetration or double agents, fearing assassination to be not beyond the realm of possibility.

What effects might there be on our operational techniques? The mere fact of the defection gives rise to security scrutiny in the opposing service, and the security review of the case may lead to an erroneous conclusion that the only way we could have got to the man was through technical means. This results in tighter audio countermeasures which in turn may affect our other operations. One of the saddest things in CI work is to have the opposition draw the right conclusion for the wrong reasons.

#### *Perishable and Priority Information*

Has he information in the CRITIC category? It is within the range of possibility, and should be looked for. But the information has to be of vital top-level interest to meet CRITIC criteria. We would look rather silly dashing off a CRITIC cable just to announce that so-and-so walked in. On the other hand, if a Soviet army officer comes in and says, "Tomorrow at five o'clock in the morning we're closing the ring around Berlin, and that's why I want out now," then get it on the wire in a hurry. Use common sense; don't panic.

Priority CI information? He may have information on opposition penetration of our installations. The opposition's key targets are in our own country. Does the man say his service has two agents in our headquarters? Find out who they are

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and get a cable on the way. Next in importance are installations behind the Curtain. If he can identify any persons in these who are opposition targets, flash the information back to headquarters. In some instances we have done quite well in getting the information to our authorities in time to have the target individuals pulled out.

He is likely to know instances of enemy control of our agents. Almost every defector we have had from an opposition intelligence service has told us of at least one man who had been doubled against us. In one startling case the officer interviewing the walk-in was making notes, and the walk-in noticed he was left-handed. After a few minutes he said, "You must be Captain Jackson." The officer nearly collapsed; this was the cover name he used in handling our most sensitive penetration of the Soviet target. It developed that the walk-in had been running the agent against us from the beginning.

High on the priority list also is information about special techniques, particularly audio and other devices, being used against us. The walk-in may say: I come from the technical support laboratory. Last week we finished installing in your Cairo embassy a new type of cavity or a new this or that. It is in the ambassador's office. It uses an entirely different principle, etc., etc.

#### *Assessment of Bona Fides*

Exhaustive psychological assessment is not a prerequisite to operational use of the subject; the ultimate explanation of the man's motivation is not an essential for his effective use. We try to get the best *practical* assessment in advance. It may be advisable to take some risks, and balanced judgment is required. The motivations of all of us could be subjected to considerable scrutiny, and we might not at the end of a long series of interrogations have given a story satisfactory from all angles. This does not keep us from being reasonably effective officers.

There is no cut-and-dried means to assess people. The longer one has lived the more one knows about people. The more experience one has had in intelligence operations dealing with intelligence people the better one should be able to assess them. We can have the psychiatrist look at the man,

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we may utilize the polygraph; but the essential thing is the assessment by the handling officer. IDCOP 59/6 sets forth a number of the assessment techniques, questions, etc. for walk-ins. These are sound pragmatic guidelines as far as they go. Other points for consideration are: Does his story ring true? Over-all, is it plausible, is it likely, is it improbable but possible, or is it all but impossible? Still one does not automatically reach a black or white conclusion. Strange things happen in the intelligence business, but there surely will be a certain ring to his story.

Does he appear to be what he claims he is? Does his physical appearance jibe with his claim? How about his manners? The way he phrases his thoughts? His vocabulary? Does he claim to be a mere salesman and then start talking about dead drops, doubles, etc.? Is he a relatively open fellow, straightforward; is he evasive; glib; apathetic; confused? Watch out for possible misinterpretation due to language difficulties. There are people who may be very smooth in their native language but don a somewhat different personality in another. This presents some difficulty in the assessment process.

What kind of person does he appear to be from a general psychological viewpoint? Is he mentally tough? Is he aggressive? Is he a charmer or a boor? Does he talk like the nuclear physicist that he claims to be? Does he talk like a man who has three doctor's degrees? What type of relationship have you been able to establish with him? How smoothly has it gone? Is it man to man? Is it professional? Some of these may seem a little out of line as strictly litmus-type tests of bona fides, but since you are the person in contact your reactions inevitably come into the assessment.

Are there any indications that he has been sent by another service? How about his documents? Even the best-planned provocation operations have little points of weakness. Turn

\*Technical analysts may require two weeks for exhaustive examination of identity documents, but preliminary analysis, photographing, and the taking of ink and paper samples can be done in two days. Sometimes imperfections are deliberately introduced into a false defector's documents to mislead us, in imitating them, into giving away our own agents. See David V. Brigane's "Credentials—Bona Fide or False" in *Studies* IV 1, p. 37 ff.

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that around: are there any indications that he was *not* sent by another service? Has he divulged any information so sensitive in our evaluation that it is unlikely another service would use it as build-up material in the case? If the man comes in and says I'm coming over from such-and-such intelligence service, and you say what's your position and what are your operations, and he reels off twenty operations in some particular country, two here, two there, more elsewhere—is it likely that any service would give away that much in order to build up the walk-in? A man comes in and says here is the story on the Soviet atomic energy program at such and such a place, chapter and verse, a lot of it checkable or we can extrapolate a lot from it. Is it likely that the Soviets would give away so much material in order to try to establish the bona fides or a portion of the bona fides of a man?

Are there any indications that he is a fabricator? Many of us have been taken in by fabricators. Their general tendency is to over-sell. The man does not merely have the mobilization plans for weapons deployment by rail; he just happens also to have access to the missile designs, he happens to have this and he happens to have that. He does not have just one source sitting in some outlying province but he has a whole net of twenty-five people.

Is there any indication that the walk-in is mentally unbalanced? This may not mean that he has no value. It just may mean that he is a tougher handling problem and that he cannot be used for certain things.

*Some Don't's for Walk-in-Handlers*

Don't bring non-staff personnel into the affair unless it is absolutely necessary. Don't expose more staff personnel than necessary either. Convenience is not enough; better to sweat with him for three or four hours than to bring in someone merely because it is convenient.

Don't leave the walk-in alone. Otherwise he may dash out and hop into a taxi, you trailing along behind trying to get him back. Every time this rule has been broken it has been one of the major contributing factors to a great flap. There has seldom been a walk-in who at one time or another fairly

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early in the game did not have second thoughts, and sometimes if he is in a position to go back he will. If you are there with him maybe he can be talked out of it, or maybe he just won't have the guts to get up and try to walk out the door. Don't leave him alone.

Don't make specific commitments on the visa business.

Don't try to convert the walk-in from Communism. A so-called expert brought in on one case was supposed to debrief the defecting intelligence officer about what he did for the service. He spent the first hour arguing about the horrors of Communism to this chap, who was a hardened Communist and also a fairly hardened intelligence officer. The walk-in was not convinced; in fact he figuratively kept twisting the interviewer over his shoulder and throwing him. They wound up almost at blows. We are not trying to convert them overnight. What we want from them initially is information. Their political attitude may be changed later, or maybe never.

Don't press him for an immediate signature of the asylum statement. On the other hand, if he volunteers or shows no great resistance, by all means get it sooner rather than later. In some circumstances you can say "Fine, welcome, I can assure you now that you have been granted general political asylum; would you please, etc., etc." Some walk-ins do not want to sign it for a while, some may not be interested in signing it for a very long time, and some never. Most will eventually.\*

Don't become so psychologically intoxicated by the glamor of it all and by your own tremendous performance that you drop your guard. With an enemy intelligence officer one might succumb to the temptation to discuss fascinating details of a complicated double agent case he had handled from

\*The handwritten and signed statement requesting asylum, denouncing the defector's own government, and affirming that if he reappears in its jurisdiction it will be because he has been kidnapped, affords us considerable protection. Penetration agents and provocateurs usually are most reluctant to sign such papers; the signed statement reduces the chances of redefection; and it protects us against charges of kidnapping or coercion.

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the other side. Pretty soon you are needlessly telling him how you handled your side of it.

Don't give the walk-in material for feed-back. This is particularly hazardous when you may be dealing with a fabricator. The clever fabricator puts out a little bit, you pounce on it and indicate to him your area of interest, etc. Some fabricators have had our officers on the hook for a couple of weeks simply by running from one session to another fabricating for each from the material they received at the last.

Don't send half-baked cables to headquarters. Calm down a little and take time to prepare one carefully. It is a good idea to get your cables out fast in certain situations, but don't drown headquarters with a lot of words that still may not convey the essential detail.